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Introduction
In philosophy of religion, omniscience continues to be a lively and controversial
topic. While some debates have come and gone, the topic of divine foreknowledge
continues to be wrestled over by very capable scholars. The rise of Open Theism in
the past twenty years has caused many people to question their assumptions about
divine foreknowledge. One formidable defender of Open Theism is William
Hasker, who has written several books and many articles on the subject. In 2012,
he wrote an essay proposing a new theodicy for natural evil. He attempted to show
that Open Theism better accounts for natural evil than Molinism or Augustinianism.
In this essay, I will show why Hasker’s theodicy can also be utilized by the
Molinist, and why Open Theism’s denial of divine foreknowledge turns God into a
reckless risk-taker. I will begin by explaining his terminology; then I will
summarize his natural order theodicy; subsequently, I will detail the implications
of his theodicy and argue that Molinism is the preferable position.

Preliminaries
To understand William Hasker’s theodicy, we must understand the definitions and
concepts he introduces at the beginning of the essay. First, he defines the term
“theodicy” as

a response to an argument from evil, an argument that claims that in view
of some evil that exists in this world it is incoherent or unreasonable to
believe in the existence of the theistic God. A theodicy replies to such an
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argument by giving a justifying reason for the existence of the evil in
question; a reason such that, if it indeed obtains, the permission of the evil
by God is morally justifiable and does not constitute a reason to
disbelieve in God's existence or his goodness (Hasker 2012, 281-282).
Subsequently, he sets forth two categories of theodicies: general-policy theodicies
and specific-benefit theodicies. General-policy theodicies attempt to explain evil by
proposing some overarching plan that God has for the universe. An example of this
would be the free will theodicy, in which God allows moral evil to occur because
intervening would violate someone’s free will. By contrast, specific-benefit
theodicies attempt to give reasons for God allowing specific events in history to
occur. For instance, if someone were to ask why God allowed his or her mother to
go through cancer and suffer a painful death, the specific-benefit theodicist would
attempt to give specific goods produced or evils averted that resulted from God
allowing this person’s mother to die.
Following this delineation, Hasker categorizes two different models of
divine providence under the terms risk-free and risk-taking. By the term risk-free,
Hasker means that God knows the consequences of his own choices and the
decisions of his creation. He places Molinism and Augustinianism in this category,
as both views support divine foreknowledge. In both views, God knows the
decisions that people will make, and how those decisions will impact the future.
The difference between the two positions is that Molinism views God’s middle
knowledge as being acquired before His divine creative decree; Augustinianism
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views God as either lacking middle knowledge or acquiring middle knowledge after
His divine creative decree. In the second Augustinian option, God acquires middle
knowledge by choosing what people would do when placed in certain
circumstances. Yet in both Augustinian options, God remains the causal power
behind every event in nature.
By the term risk-taking, Hasker means that God does not know the farreaching consequences of his actions or the actions of his creation. Under this
category Hasker puts Open Theism and simple foreknowledge. In Open Theism,
God does not know the future, and therefore makes decisions based on probabilities
and the present conditions; whatever has the greatest probability of resulting in a
good action or effect, God chooses to help bring it about.1 In simple foreknowledge,
God does know the future, but he cannot affect it in any meaningful way. The
unchanging nature of the future results from God’s infallible belief: if God were to
know something prior to its occurrence, and an action or event occurs which
contradicts God’s foreknowledge, then He would hold a false belief. Since the
standard definition of omniscience holds that God knows all true propositions, His
beliefs cannot be false, and thus God cannot change the future. The implications of

1. The consensus among Open Theists is that God does not have knowledge of the future
because he created humans with libertarian freedom. Open Theists argue that divine foreknowledge
is logically incompatible with libertarian freedom; since libertarian freedom is required for moral
responsibility and genuinely loving relationships, God creates humans with this freedom so that he
can have relationship with his creation. Depending upon the person’s defense of Open Theism, God
either 1) cannot have knowledge of the future because the future is unknowable, or 2) the future is
knowable, but God restricts his knowledge out of love for humanity.
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simple foreknowledge are clear: if God created a world, and upon creating the
world he foreknew that a man would be brutally murdered, He could not prevent
that murder due to His own nature. In this way God can be called “risk-taking”; he
created a world knowing that evil could potentially occur that He could not stop.2
Drawing from these categories, Hasker argues that certain models of
providence can only use certain types of theodicies. In the case of risk-taking
models of providence, a general-policy theodicy is the only option available. This
makes sense, as the Open Theist would never be able to give specific goods
produced or evils averted, since God does not know what will happen in the future.
Hasker also argues that risk-free models of providence can only use specific-benefit
theodicies. Hasker claims that

the God of Molinism or Augustinianism has decided to permit the evil in
question in the light of full knowledge of the evil itself and its specific
consequences. It seems, then, most implausible that God would permit the
evil simply on the basis of general policies, while ignoring the particulars
surrounding the occurrence of the evil and its consequences (284).
Using his terminology, Hasker’s theodicy may be described as a general-policy
theodicy combatting the claim that natural evil disproves the existence of God.

Hasker’s Natural Order Theodicy

2. This is the analysis given by Hasker and other Open Theists. David Hunt, who is a
proponent of simple foreknowledge, has argued against this conclusion. See his article “Divine
Providence and Simple Foreknowledge,” Faith and Philosophy 10, no. 3 (June 1993): 396-416.

Quaerens Deum

Spring 2016 Volume 2 Issue 1

Justice 5

Now that the groundwork has been laid, Hasker’s actual argument can be examined.
He begins by describing five good structural features of a world. He says that “if it
is good that a world should exist with these structural features, it is also justifiable
that the natural evils should be allowed to exist; they are, so to speak, the price of
admission for the existence of such a world” (288). First, he claims that it is good
that there should be a world. The term “world” here means “the sum total of
concrete things that exist, other than God if there is a God” (ibid.). This first
assertion gives minimal value to existence itself and denies the nihilistic claim that
existence has no value. Second, he claims that it is good that there should be a
complex, multi-leveled natural world. By this, he means that many different entities
and kinds of entities exist, each with varying levels of internal complexity and
causal powers, and these entities act within their own causal powers, without
interference from a higher power. This great variety would allow for the third good:
that a world contains beings that are sentient and rational. Hasker thinks that a good
world should be appreciated by its occupants: “…if the world is good, then it is
desirable that it be found to be so by its inhabitants, and surely their appreciation
of it will require extensive sensory capacities as well as reason, which is needed to
enable the evaluation” (290).
Fourth, Hasker believes it is good that the creatures in the world should
enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy. If a being has inherent causal capabilities,
is sentient, and is rational, then Hasker believes it should have some form of
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personal autonomy. Hasker thinks that “to the extent that this is done, the intrinsic
worth of the being is more clearly exhibited than it would be were this degree of
independence not allowed” (ibid.). Fifth, Hasker thinks that “it is good that there
should be an evolving world, a world in which the universe as a whole as well as
its component systems develop from within, utilizing their inherent powers and
potentialities” (291). While he does not explicitly explain why an evolving world
would be good, he quotes Henry Ward Beecher to get his point across:

If single acts would evince design, how much more a vast universe, that by
inherent laws gradually built itself and then created its own plants and
animals, a universe so adjusted that it left by the way the poorest things, and
steadily wrought toward more complex, ingenious, and beautiful results!
Who designed this mighty machine, created matter, gave it its laws, and
impressed upon it that tendency which has brought forth almost infinite
results on the globe, and wrought them into a perfect system? Design by
wholesale is grander than design by retail (Beecher 1885, 114).
Once he establishes these five structural features, Hasker attempts to
explain why natural evil must occur in a natural world. He begins with volcanic
eruptions, earthquakes, and tsunamis, which all originate from plate tectonics.
While these catastrophes do produce massive amounts of destruction, the shifting
of tectonic plates creates effects that are necessary for life on earth. These effects
include the strong magnetic fields surrounding the earth, and the key transitional
points within the evolutionary process that result from volcanic eruptions.
Additionally, Hasker discusses hurricanes, tornadoes, and drought, which
are caused by changes in our natural weather system. In response, he says that these
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events are natural parts of our ordinary weather cycle. It does not matter if they are
detrimental to our overall way of life; nature is indifferent to our wants and desires
and does not adapt to our needs. If it did so, then these would not be natural laws.
Finally, Hasker tackles the general pain and suffering that animals and
humans experience. He responds by concluding that pain and suffering are natural
parts of the evolutionary process and help us survive. Death and pain are necessary
for evolution to occur:

Admittedly, great pain is sometimes suffered when the harm is already
beyond the point where anything can be done about it. But to insist that pain
ought to be present only when it is possible for the harm it signals to be
alleviated is to make a demand that surpasses the engineering limitations of
the organism (Hasker, 295).
While answering questions about different kinds of natural evil, Hasker also
attempts to answer questions about the world as a whole. As an example, a skeptic
might ask why God could not make a better natural system than this one; in this
proposed system, pleasure would outnumber pain and give us a better overall
existence. Hasker gives two different responses. He first claims that we cannot
compare the real world to alternative worlds with different natural laws because we
don’t know what those worlds would be like. The questioner can ask if God could
do better, but we don’t really know what better natural laws would look like.
Secondly, due to fine-tuning, it seems unlikely that a world that had
different natural laws could exist. Fine-tuning shows us that many physical
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conditions must occur within an extremely small range of variation; if these values
changed a miniscule amount, the universe would not be able to exist. Based off this
fact, the idea that a world could contain vastly different natural laws seems
extremely unlikely.3
With his initial claims being rebutted, the objector may try to shift the blame
onto God for the seeming cruelty of nature:

But if nature can be neither kind nor cruel, should we conclude that cruelty
is rather to be attributed to the one who planned and created such a system?
Not unless, reversing the judgments we have made up to this point, we are
prepared to say that the existence of the world is a bad thing overall—that
it would be better that nothing at all should exist (or nothing other than God)
than that such a world as this one should be (296).
Because many people are not nihilist, few would say that it would be better that
nothing should exist rather than something; thus, this objection seems to fall flat.
To conclude the argument, Hasker summarizes his Natural Order Theodicy in
syllogistic form:
1. The actual universe is a complex, multi‐leveled natural world,
containing creatures that are sentient as well as some that are
intelligent. The world has developed to its present state through a
complex evolutionary process, and enjoys a considerable amount of
autonomy in its functioning.
2. The universe so constituted makes possible a large amount of good,
both in the order and beauty of the physical universe and in the
development and flourishing of a myriad of living creatures. It also
unavoidably contains a great deal of suffering and death.
3. One example of fine-tuning would be gravitational forces. If these forces were increased
or decreased by even the most miniscule amount, gravity could either crush us or cause us to float
off the surface of the earth. There are over 100 different examples of fine-tuning widely recognized
by scientists today, which makes this response particularly compelling.
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3. There is no good reason for us to suppose that some alternative order
of nature, capable of being created by an all‐powerful God, would
surpass the present universe in its potentiality for good or in its
balance of good versus evil.
4. In virtue of 1–3, it is good that God has created this universe; there
is no basis for holding God morally at fault for doing so, or for
supposing that a perfectly good Creator would have acted
differently (298).

Implications of Hasker’s Theodicy
Using his theodicy as a foundation for a further point, Hasker asks an important
question: due to the non-moral nature of evolution, who is responsible for the
gruesome circumstances we find in nature? He points out a National Geographic
documentary, where a pack of wolves forms a blockade around a rival pack’s den
and starves the young cubs to death. How is this kind of brutal behavior allowed to
occur? For Hasker, Molinism and Augustinianism provide an insufficient answer:

For both Augustinians and Molinists, the answer is entirely clear: this
particular sequence of events, like every other, is the consequence of God's
intentional, specific, and minutely detailed choice of a world to make actual
… God, then, specifically planned and intended the spider's capture of the
moth, the blockade and starvation of the wolf cubs, and many, many other
such ‘trivial details’. Nothing could be clearer than this, however chilling
the consequences as we contemplate the fate of the wolf cubs (300, original
emphasis).
Conversely, the God of Open Theism seems to escape the scenario where he intends
the suffering of his creation:

God has planned and brought into being the universe with all of its inherent
laws and structure, and has permitted the natural course of events to
proceed, but God has not specifically ‘planned, ordered, provided for, and
ensured’ each and every event that takes place, including the capture of the
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moth, the starvation of the wolf cubs, and a great many even more unsavory
events that disfigure human history. God, indeed, is deeply grieved at many
of these events, yet in his gracious wisdom he grants to the creation the
degree of autonomy needed to act according to its own nature, and refrains
from frequent, intrusive intervention into the course of earthly events (ibid.,
original emphasis).
Because God does not know the future, he cannot intend the consequences of his
actions, which in this case would entail the starvation of young wolf cubs.
Therefore, Hasker thinks that Open Theism provides a better fit for his Natural
Order Theodicy, and thus has the advantage over Molinism and Augustinianism.
While I do believe that Hasker’s critique proves difficult for
Augustinianism, I disagree with Hasker’s evaluation of Molinism. Instead, I will
argue that Molinism provides a better answer to the problem of natural evil and
gives real substance to the Natural Order Theodicy.

Which Position Best Handles the Problem of Natural Evil?
To begin, Hasker’s insistence that Molinism and Augustinianism cannot use
general-policy theodicies seems misguided. To recall, Hasker thinks that the
Molinist or Augustinian God could not permit evil based on general policies and
“ignore the particulars” (284) surrounding an evil event. However, the Molinist or
the Augustinian never says that God would “ignore the particulars”; he merely
thinks that God might have a general principle that, in full view of the specific
circumstances surrounding a situation, would still justify God permitting that evil.
Nothing inherent in Molinism or Augustinianism contradicts this idea.
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Furthermore, Hasker never gives evidence as to why God’s use of general policies
seems “implausible”; he just states his opinion and moves on. Based on this lack of
support, the Molinist should be perfectly justified in using general-policy theodicies
to defend God’s permission of an evil event. Kenneth Perszyk even proposes how
God might use middle knowledge when deciding between general strategies:

By his middle knowledge, he sees which strategies are and aren't open to
him … He sees what would result on the condition that he pursue each
strategy … He sees what would result from various combinations of natural
laws, or from different sets of laws of varying complexity; he sees which
ones would allow for the emergence of significant finite free agency, and
which would not. He compares the results and picks one or more of them.
Far from middle knowledge being incompatible with following general
strategies, it's arguable that it gives the notion real substance (Perszyk 1998,
171).
At this point it might be beneficial to clarify middle knowledge and its
impact on human freedom. While this paper focuses primarily on Open Theism,
Molinism, and natural evil, the laws of nature can impact the circumstances which
humans find themselves in, thereby affecting God’s middle knowledge. When a
Molinist mentions middle knowledge, he or she is referring to God’s knowledge of
what person P would choose to do in circumstances C. William Lane Craig explains
this concept using Peter’s denial of Jesus as an illustration:

By his natural knowledge God knew in the first [logical] moment all the
possible things that Peter could do if placed in such circumstances. But now
in this second [logical] moment he knows what Peter would in fact freely
choose to do under such circumstances. This is not because Peter would be
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causally determined by the circumstances to act in this way. No, Peter is
entirely free, and under the same circumstances he could choose to act in
another way … if it is true that Peter would sin if placed in certain
circumstances, it follows that even though a world with identical
circumstances in which Peter does not sin is [logically] possible,
nevertheless it is not within God’s power to create that world (Craig 2000,
130).
God could not create the logically possible world where Peter did not sin
because it was not feasible. Feasibility denotes whether a world could be actualized
based upon a person’s free choice; if someone would not choose to perform an
action given certain circumstances, then the possible world containing that action
is not feasible. Under this definition of feasibility, the future free choices of persons
are not causally determined by the circumstances; the circumstances themselves are
causally irrelevant to the decision of the person. This means that God’s knowledge
of these circumstances, called counterfactuals, is contingently true:

[person] S could freely decide to refrain from [action] a in [circumstance]
C, so that different counterfactuals could be true and be known by God than
those that are. Hence, although it is essential to God that He have middle
knowledge, it is not essential to Him to have middle knowledge of those
particular propositions which He does in fact know (Craig 1991, 238).
The contingent truth of counterfactuals also provides a rebuttal to theological
fatalism. While God does know via middle knowledge what we would do when
placed in certain circumstances, this knowledge does not constrain our freedom in
any way. If we were to act in a way that contradicted God’s knowledge, then He
would simply know that we would act that way instead of what He knows now
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(Craig 2000, 66-67). On the Molinist scheme, what we choose to do determines
God’s middle knowledge, and then God’s middle knowledge determines what
feasible worlds are available for God to make actual.
Moving to the Natural Order Theodicy itself, no part of the argument seems
to prohibit the Molinist from adopting it and using it for her position. Indeed,
premise 3 seems to gain even greater support on the Molinist scheme, as it can be
argued that the actual world is the best feasible world.4 God, by his middle
knowledge, would ensure that the actual world’s laws of nature provide the best
balance of good versus evil. Of course, this “best balance” would still allow for the
free will of human beings, meaning that the only feasible option for God in some
situations would be to allow evils to be committed. However, one of the good
structural features of a world discussed previously was personal autonomy, and it
seems that sacrificing libertarian free will is not a viable option for someone who
wants to uphold the idea of moral responsibility. Consequently, if this notion of
“best balance” is in fact the case, then premise 3 is much better supported on the
Molinist scheme.

4. This should not be confused with the best possible world, as this is a separate notion. A
best possible world is the best logically possible world; a best feasible world is the best world God
is capable of actualizing considering the free choices of human beings. In a series of lectures at
Aalborg University on the Problem of Evil, William Lane Craig gives a good distinction between
these two ideas.. A video of these lectures may be found at www.reasonablefaith.org/media/theproblem-of-suffering-and-evil-aalborg-university.
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Additionally, the defenses which Hasker uses to rebut potential objections
could be adopted by the Molinist. The Molinist could insist that natural events
which cause destruction of human and animal life are necessary for the
improvement and progression of life on earth. Additionally, the Molinist could
argue that logically possible worlds with different sets of natural laws were not
feasible for God, thereby bolstering Hasker’s fine-tuning argument. The only
defense that would not work is Hasker’s denial of foreknowledge, which directly
contradicts the Molinist’s acceptance of divine foreknowledge.
Finally, we move to Hasker’s primary critique of Molinism. Throughout his
essay, Hasker particularly emphasizes the idea of the Molinist God intending evil
events to occur. He thinks that Open Theism removes any hint of God’s intentions
being involved with evil, and thus he escapes criticism. Ironically, it seems that
Molinism actually gives the intention/permission distinction real meaning, and that
Open Theism leaves God with no intention or permission. With deterministic
positions like Augustinianism, it becomes exceedingly difficult to argue that God
does not intend each occurrence of evil, as on this view God “ordains” all things to
occur.
In the Molinist scheme, due to the acceptance of libertarian free will, the
distinction between intention and permission may still be intact. The Molinist can
argue that
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God's general concurrence is intrinsically neutral or indifferent; it's rendered
inefficacious (in the case of an evil effect) by the free secondary cause. At
the time of action, Molinists will insist that it's really possible for us to
refrain (freely) from the evil action, even though it's not possible for God
that we do otherwise than he foreknew (Perszyk, 169).
If this neutral support does allow for libertarian free will, then God can truly be said
to not intend evil, but simply permit evil to occur. Thus, if a Molinist can show that
the intention/permission distinction holds in moral evil, then this same distinction
should hold in cases of natural evil as well. The Molinist could argue that some
natural evils are the result of free secondary causes. This way, God could permit
these secondary causes to run their course due to a general strategy or specific
benefit resulting from the event.
In the Open Theist scheme, however, God seems to lack both intention and
permission of evil:

Being able to say that God permits evil implies that God could have
prevented it. Being able to prevent evil, in turn, implies that one had
sufficient knowledge about it and power to prevent it. If God's omniscience
doesn't (or can't) include foreknowledge of free human actions, there may
be a sense in which God cannot even be said to permit our evil free actions
(Perszyk, 170).
If God does not intend or permit evil events, it seems that God is just an ignorant
deity who waits for bad things to happen, and then rushes in to clean up the
aftermath.

A Fatal Dilemma for Open Theism
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From these previous critiques of Hasker, it seems that Molinism is, at the very least,
on the same playing field as Open Theism when responding to the problem of
natural evil. Additionally, Perszyk provides what may be a decisive point in favor
of Molinism. He suggests that Open Theism is in a fatal dilemma in relation to God
and his probability-based decision making.5
As a test case, imagine the God of Open Theism. He has perfect knowledge
of the past and present, but can only know what would probably happen in the
future. Hasker argues that God cannot know the future because it is logically
impossible for anyone, including God, to know the future. Suppose God thought it
was highly likely, due to present conditions and His probability calculations, that a
devastating hurricane would strike the coast of Florida in the near future. If God
permitted that hurricane to occur or brought about the circumstances in which that
hurricane would likely occur, then Open Theism would be more vulnerable to
Hasker’s own critiques of Molinism.6 Because humans can predict weather patterns
with good accuracy, even though we are finite creatures, God could have known
with confidence that this hurricane would occur, especially when He has perfect
knowledge of the past and present. In this case it seems that God at least permitted,
if not intended, the evil to occur, which Hasker wants to avoid. Moreover, suppose

5. My argument is an adaptation of Perszyk’s argument in “Molinism and Theodicy,”
174-175. In his article, he addresses moral evil; I’ve used his core critique but substituted in an
example of natural evil.
6. Even though God’s permission of evil seems questionable on the Open Theist model, I
will give Hasker the benefit of the doubt here.
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the probabilities were lower than 50 percent, but still “non-negligible,” to use
Perszyk’s term (174). Even then, God might still be blameworthy for taking an
unnecessary risk, considering the likelihood of the hurricane.
To avoid his own critiques of Molinism, Hasker would have to decrease, if
not entirely eliminate, God’s ability to make probability calculations. If God did
not know as much about the future, then Hasker could avoid the charge of God
intending evil. However, the less God knows about the future, the more it looks like
God is blindly making decisions. If God is choosing to act without the proper
information, then God seems increasingly reckless and our confidence in His
providence will dwindle away. It seems then that Hasker has two choices: either
accept that his conception of God is closer to the Molinist conception than he would
like to admit and accordingly provide a clarified concept of the intention/permission
distinction, or accept that God recklessly risks the well-being of humanity for what
He thinks is a better future. If he accepts the first option, then he must show how
God can accurately be described as “permitting” evils if He does not have divine
foreknowledge. If he accepts the second option, then the God of Open Theism is
not worthy of worship.
At this point, Hasker might feel cheated by my argument. He might think
that I have glossed over the controversy surrounding Molinism; this is
understandable, considering Hasker has been a well-known advocate of the
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“grounding” objection to Molinism.7 I think he would be partially right, in that a
discussion of the objections to Molinism goes beyond the scope of this paper. Yet
I think this response would also miss the point of my argument. The thrust of my
critique has been the following: assuming Open Theism and Molinism have no fatal
flaws in their understanding of divine foreknowledge or providence, which position
provides the best response to the problem of evil? Given that assumption, I think
Hasker must face the dilemma I explained above. Of course, he could argue that
counterfactuals of freedom are ungrounded, and consequently that Molinism is
false; nevertheless, this would do nothing to dismiss the dilemma I presented above.
Thus, given the assumption that neither position is fatally flawed, I think my
conclusion still stands: Molinism provides a better response to the problem of
natural evil.

Conclusion
In this paper, I began by expounding William Hasker’s Natural Order Theodicy,
starting with his definition and categories of both theodicies and models of
providence. I then moved on to Hasker’s actual argument, explaining how a
structurally good world can give God justification for allowing natural evil to occur.
After dealing with potential objections and presenting Hasker’s critique of

7. The “grounding” objection is the argument that counterfactuals of freedom do not have
any ground which causes them to be true. For Hasker’s original formulation of this argument, see
“A Refutation of Middle Knowledge,” Noûs 20, no. 4 (December 1986): 545-557. For the revised
version of the argument, see “Middle Knowledge: A Refutation Revisited,” Faith and Philosophy
12, no. 2 (April 1995): 223-236.

Quaerens Deum

Spring 2016 Volume 2 Issue 1

Justice 19

Molinism, I proceeded to show that Molinism readily adopts Hasker’s argument
and provides it with further support. Subsequently, I showed that Open Theism has
real problems in its conception of divine foreknowledge while simultaneously
arguing for Molinism’s substantive intention/permission distinction. In the end, it
seems that the God of Open Theism is a reckless risk-taker, while the God of
Molinism is sovereign, powerful, and untamed.
Yet this should not be the end of the discussion; more nuance is needed in
the Molinist response to natural evil that reaches beyond the scope of this essay.
Should the Molinist promote a “best feasible world” argument? Can one prove that
there are free secondary causes in nature? If so, how similar are they to freedom
found in human agents? These questions could have a serious impact on discussions
of the problem of evil, and deserve to be answered. Hasker presumptuously
sounded the death knell on Molinist responses to the problem of evil; in reality,
there is much fruitful discussion yet to come.
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